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Abstract
We present a probabilistic justification logic, PPJ, as a framework for
uncertain reasoning about rational belief, degrees of belief and justifi-
cations. We establish soundness and strong completeness for PPJ with
respect to the class of so-called measurable Kripke-like models and show
that the satisfiability problem is decidable. We discuss how PPJ provides
insight into the well-known lottery paradox.
Keywords: justification logic, probabilistic logic, strong completeness, decid-
ability, lottery paradox
1 Introduction
In epistemic modal logic, we use formulas of the form A to express that A
is believed. Justification logic unfolds the -modality into a family of so-called
justification terms to represent evidence for an agent’s belief. That is in justifi-
cation logic we use t : A to state that A is believed for reason t.
Originally, Artemov developed the first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs, to
give a classical provability semantics for intuitionistic logic [1, 2, 6, 20, 21]. Later,
Fitting [9] introduced epistemic models for justification logic. As it turned out
this interpretation provides a very successful approach to study many epistemic
puzzles and problems [3, 7, 19].
∗Corresponding author
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In this paper, we extend justification logic with probability operators in order
to accommodate the idea that
different kinds of evidence for A lead to different degrees of belief in A. (1)
In [15] we have introduced a first probabilistic justification logic PJ, which fea-
tures formulas of the form P≥s(t : A) to state that the probability of t : A is
greater than or equal to s. The language of PJ, however, does neither include
justification statements over probabilities (i.e. t : (P≥sA)) nor iterated proba-
bilities (i.e. P≥r(P≥sA)).
In the present paper, we remedy these shortcomings and present the logic PPJ,
which supports formulas of the form t : (P≥sA) as well as P≥r(P≥sA). This
explains the name PPJ: the two P ’s refer to iterated P -operators. The necessity
of allowing iterations of the probability operators can be seen when one wants
to express a statement like “I am uncertain for a justification about the fact
that a coin is counterfeit”. While the previous statement cannot be expressed
in the non-iterated probabilistic logic PJ it can be expressed nicely in PPJ by a
formula of the form P≥s(t : P≥rA) where A is the event that a coin lands tails,
P≥rA is a formula expressing that the coin is counterfeit (for some r > 12 ), t is a
justification for the fact that the coin is counterfeit and r and s are probabilities
expressing our uncertainty for the event that the coin lands tails and for the
fact that t is a justification for the coin being counterfeit.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 3 we introduce syntax and seman-
tics for PPJ and establish soundness and strong completeness. In Section 4 we
show that satisfiability for PPJ is decidable and finally in Section 5 we present
an application of PPJ to the lottery paradox.
Related work. The design of PPJ follows that of LPP1, which is a probability
logic over classical propositional logic [27, 28]. The proofs that we present for
PPJ are extensions of the corresponding proofs for LPP1. Note, however, that
these extensions are non-trivial due to the presence of formulas of the form
t : (P≥sA).
As already mentioned, PJ [15] is the precursor of PPJ without iterations of
probability operators. Kokkinis [14] shows that the satisfiability problem in PJ
has the same complexity as the corresponding problem in the underlying justi-
fication logic and that the satisfiability problem in PPJ is PSPACE-complete,
which is the usual suspect in modal logics.
Our probability logics are not compact. Consider the set
T := {¬P=0A} ∪ {P<1/nA | n is a positive integer}.
Although every finite subset of T is satisfiable, the set T is not. Hence in order to
obtain a strong completeness result, we use an infinitary rule, which originates
from [27, 29, 30].
Milnikel [25] proposes a logic with uncertain justifications. We thoroughly study
the relationship between Milnikel’s logic and our approach in [15] where we show
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that three of his four axioms are theorems in our logic and that the fourth axiom
holds under an additional independence assumption.
In [11, 12] Ghari presents fuzzy variants of justification logic, in which an agent
can have a justification for a statement with certainty between 0 and 1. He
introduces fuzzy Fitting models and establishes a graded completeness theorem.
Ghari also shows that Milnikel’s principles are valid in his fuzzy setting.
Fan and Liau [8] introduce a possibilistic justification logic, which is an explicit
version of a graded modal logic. Their logic includes formulas t :r A to express
that according to evidence t, A is believed with certainty at least r. However,
the following principle holds in their logic:
s :r A ∧ t :q A→ s :max(r,q) A.
Hence all justifications for a belief yield the same (strongest) certainty, which is
not in accordance with our guiding idea (1).
Artemov [5] studies a justification logic to formalize aggregated probabilistic
evidence. His approach can handle conflicting and inconsistent data as well as
positive and negative evidence for the same proposition.
Funding
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2 The Probabilistic Justification Logic PPJ
In this section we present syntax and semantics for the probabilistic justification
logic PPJ.
Syntax
Justification terms are built from countably many constants and countably many
variables according to the following grammar:
t ::= c | x | (t · t) | (t+ t) | !t
where c is a constant and x is a variable. Tm denotes the set of all terms and
Con denotes the sets of all constants. For any term t and natural number n we
define !0t := t and !n+1t := ! (!nt).
Let Prop be a countable set of atomic propositions. We will represent the set of
all rational numbers with the symbol Q. We define Q[0, 1] := Q ∩ [0, 1], while
Q[0, t) will denote the set [0, t) ∩Q[0, 1].
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The set of formulas L is defined by the following grammar1:
A ::= p | P≥sA | ¬A | A ∧A | t : A
where t ∈ Tm, s ∈ Q[0, 1] and p ∈ Prop. We define the following abbreviations:
A ∨B ≡ ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B)
A→ B ≡ ¬A ∨B
A↔ B ≡ (A→ B) ∧ (B → A)
⊥ ≡ A ∧ ¬A, for some A ∈ L
> ≡ A ∨ ¬A, for some A ∈ L
Additionally, we set
P<sA ≡ ¬P≥sA P≤sA ≡ P≥1−s¬A
P>sA ≡ ¬P≤sA P=sA ≡ P≥sA ∧ P≤sA
The axiom schemes of PPJ are presented in Figure 1. Axiom (NN) corresponds
to the fact that the probability of truthfulness of every formula is at least 0 (the
acronym (NN) stands for non-negative). Observe that by substituting ¬A for A
in (NN), we have P≥0¬A, which by our syntactical abbreviations is P≤1A. Hence
axiom (NN) also corresponds to the fact that the probability of truthfulness for
every formula is at most 1. Axioms (L1) and (L2) describe some properties
of inequalities (the L in (L1) and (L2) stands for less). Axioms (Add1) and
(Add2) correspond to the additivity of probabilities for disjoint events (the Add
in (Add1) and (Add2) stands for additivity).
(P) finitely many schemes in the language of L
axiomatizing classical propositional logic
(J) ` u : (A→ B)→ (v : A→ u · v : B)
(+) ` u : A ∨ v : A→ u+ v : A
(NN) ` P≥0A
(L1) ` P≤rA→ P<sA, where s > r
(L2) ` P<sA→ P≤sA
(Add1) ` P≥rA ∧ P≥sB ∧ P≥1¬(A ∧B)→ P≥min(1,r+s)(A ∨B)
(Add2) ` P≤rA ∧ P<sB → P<r+s(A ∨B), where r + s ≤ 1
Figure 1: Axioms Schemes of PPJ
A constant specification is any set CS that satisfies
CS ⊆ {(c, A) | c is a constant and
A is an instance of some axiom of PPJ} .
1In order to have a countable language and obtain decidability, we restrict our probabilistic
operators to the rational numbers.
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A constant specification CS is called:
axiomatically appropriate: if for every axiom instance A of PPJ, there exists
a constant c such that (c, A) ∈ CS;
schematic: if for every constant c, the set {A
∣∣ (c, A) ∈ CS} consists of all
instances of several (possibly zero) axiom schemes;
finite: if CS is a finite set;
decidable: if CS is a decidable set;
almost schematic: if CS = CS1 ∪ CS2 where CS1 ∩ CS2 = ∅, CS1 is schematic
and CS2 is finite.
The notion of a schematic constant specification is crucial for establishing de-
cidability of PPJ.
Let CS be any constant specification. The deductive system PPJCS is the Hilbert
system obtained by adding to the axioms of PPJ the rules (MP), (PN), (ST) and
(AN!) as given in Figure 2. Rule (PN) is the probabilistic analogue of the ne-
cessitation rule in modal logics (hence the acronym (PN) stands for probabilist
necessitation): if a formula is valid, then it has probability 1. Rule (ST) intu-
itively states that if the probability of a formula is arbitrary close to s, then it
is at least s. The acronym (ST) stands for strenghtening. Note that (ST) is an
infinitary rule, which we need to obtain strong completeness.
axioms of PPJ
+
(AN!) ` !n+1c : !nc : · · · : !c : c : A, where (c, A) ∈ CS and n ∈ N
(MP) if T ` A and T ` A→ B then T ` B
(PN) if ` A then ` P≥1A
(ST) if T ` A→ P≥s− 1kB for every integer k ≥
1
s and s > 0
then T ` A→ P≥sB
Figure 2: System PPJCS
A formula A is deducible from a set T of formulas (T ` A) if there is an at most
countable sequence of formulas A0, A1, . . . , A such that every Ai is an axiom or
a formula from the set T , or it is derived from the preceding formulas by an
inference rule, with the exception that Rule (PN) can be applied on the theorems
only. A formula A is a theorem (` A) if it is deducible from the empty set.
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Semantics
To introduce semantics for PPJCS, we begin with the notion of a basic evaluation,
which is the cornerstone for many interpretations of justification logic [4, 18]. In
the following we use P(X) to denote the power set of a set X. We will also use
the symbols T and F to represent the truth values true and false respectively.
Definition 1 (Basic Evaluation). Let CS be a constant specification. A basic
evaluation for CS, or a basic CS-evaluation, is a function ∗ that maps atomic
propositions to truth values and maps justification terms to subsets of L, i.e.
∗ : Prop→ {T,F} and ∗ : Tm→ P(L),
such that for u, v ∈ Tm, for c ∈ Con and A,B ∈ L we have:
1.
(
A→ B ∈ u∗ and A ∈ v∗
)
=⇒ B ∈ (u · v)∗
2. u∗ ∪ v∗ ⊆ (u+ v)∗
3. if (c, A) ∈ CS then for all n ∈ N we have2:
!n−1c : !n−2c : · · · :!c : c : A ∈ (!nc)∗.
We usually write t∗ and p∗ instead of ∗(t) and ∗(p), respectively.
Definition 2 (Algebra over a Set). Let W be a non-empty set and let H be a
non-empty subset of P(W ). We call H an algebra over W iff the following hold:
• W ∈ H;
• U, V ∈ H =⇒ U ∪ V ∈ H;
• U ∈ H =⇒W \ U ∈ H .
Definition 3 (Finitely Additive Measure). Let H be an algebra over W and
µ : H → [0, 1]. We call µ a finitely additive measure iff the following hold:
1. µ(W ) = 1;
2. for all U, V ∈ H:
U ∩ V = ∅ =⇒ µ(U ∪ V ) = µ(U) + µ(V ) .
Definition 4 (Probability Space). A probability space is a triple
Prob = 〈W,H, µ〉 ,
where:
2We agree to the convention that the formula !n−1c : !n−2c : · · · : !c : c : A represents the
formula A for n = 0.
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• W is a non-empty set;
• H is an algebra over W ;
• µ : H → [0, 1] is a finitely additive measure.
Definition 5 (Model). Let CS be a constant specification. A PPJCS-model is
a quintuple M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 where:
1. U is a non-empty set of objects called worlds;
2. W,H, µ and ∗ are functions, which have U as their domain, such that for
every w ∈ U :
• 〈W (w), H(w), µ(w)〉 is a probability space with W (w) ⊆ U ;
• ∗w is a basic CS-evaluation3.
The ternary satisfaction relation |= is defined between models, worlds, and for-
mulas.
Definition 6 (Truth in a PPJCS-model). Let CS be a constant specification
and let M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 be a PPJCS-model. We define what it means for an
L-formula to hold in M at a world w ∈ U inductively as follows:
M,w |= p :⇐⇒ p∗w = T for p ∈ Prop
M,w |= P≥sB :⇐⇒
(






where [B]M,w = {x ∈W (w) | M,x |= B}
M,w |= ¬B :⇐⇒ M,w 6|= B
M,w |= B ∧ C :⇐⇒
(
M,w |= B and M,w |= C
)
M,w |= t : B :⇐⇒ B ∈ t∗w
Definition 7 (Measurable Model). Let CS be a constant specification and let
M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 be a PPJCS-model. M is called measurable iff for every
w ∈ U and for every A ∈ L:
[A]M,w ∈ H(w) .
PPJCS,Meas denotes the class of PPJCS-measurable models.
Let T ⊆ L. ThenM,w |= T means thatM,w |= A for all A ∈ T . Further T |= A
means that for allM ∈ PPJCS,Meas and for every world w ofM ,M,w |= T implies
M,w |= A.
To be precise we should write T `CS A and T |=CS A instead of T ` A and
T |= A, respectively, since these two notions depend on a given constant speci-
fication CS. However, CS will always be clear from the context and thus can be
omitted.
3We will usually write ∗w instead of ∗(w).
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Definition 8 (Satisfiability). We say a formula A of L is satisfiable if there
exist a PPJCS,Meas-model M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 and w ∈ U with M,w |= A. A
set of formulas T is satisfiable if there is a world w from a model M such that
every formula from T holds in M at w.
The following lemma was proved for the probabilistic justification logic PJ
in [15]. The same proof also works in PPJ.
Lemma 9. For any PPJCS we have:
` A→ B =⇒ ` P≥sA→ P≥sB .
We established the Deduction Theorem for PJ in [15]. Now we present the
version for PPJ, which can be proved in the same way.
Theorem 10 (Deduction Theorem). Let T ⊆ L and A,B ∈ L. For any con-
stant specification CS we have:
T,A ` B ⇐⇒ T ` A→ B .
3 Soundness and Completeness
As usual, we can establish soundness by induction on the depth of the derivation
of a formula A.
Theorem 11 (Soundness). For any constant specification CS, PPJCS is sound
with respect to the class of PPJCS,Meas-models. I.e. for any A ∈ L and T ⊆ L
we have:
T ` A =⇒ T |= A .
The completeness proof for PPJCS is a combination of the completeness proof
for LPP1 [28] and the completeness proof for PJ [15]. In the rest of the section
we are going to present a series of definitions and lemmata that lead to the
strong completeness theorem for PPJ. When the proofs are very similar to the
ones for PJ we will simply provide a reference to [15].
First we need the notion of a PPJCS-consistent set.
Definition 12 (PPJCS-consistent Set). Let CS be a constant specification and
let T be a set of L-formulas.
• T is said to be PPJCS-consistent iff T 0 ⊥. Otherwise T is said to be
PPJCS-inconsistent.
• T is said to be maximal iff for every A ∈ L either A ∈ T or ¬A ∈ T .
• T is said to be maximal PPJCS-consistent iff it is maximal and PPJCS-
consistent.
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The next two lemmata state some standard properties of PPJCS-consistent sets.
Both lemmata have been proved in [15] for the logic PJ. The proofs for PPJ are
similar. Lemma 13 is essential for the construction of maximal consistent sets.
Its second claim is needed to deal with the rule (ST).
Lemma 13 (Properties of PPJCS-Consistent Sets). Let CS be a constant speci-
fication and let T be a PPJCS-consistent set of L-formulas.
(1) For any formula A ∈ L we have that T,A is PPJCS-consistent or T,¬A is
PPJCS-consistent.
(2) If ¬(A → P≥sB) ∈ T for s > 0, then there is some integer n ≥ 1s such
that T,¬(A→ P≥s− 1nB) is PPJCS-consistent.
Lemma 14 (Properties of Maximal PPJCS-Consistent Sets). Let CS be a con-
stant specification and let T be a maximal PPJCS-consistent set. Then the fol-
lowing hold:
(1) For any formula A ∈ L, exactly one member of {A,¬A} is in T .
(2) For any formula A ∈ L:
T ` A⇐⇒ A ∈ T
(3) For all formulas A,B ∈ L we have:
A ∨B ∈ T ⇐⇒ A ∈ T or B ∈ T
(4) For all formulas A,B ∈ L we have:
A ∧B ∈ T ⇐⇒ {A,B} ⊆ T
(5) For all formulas A,B ∈ L we have:
{A,A→ B} ⊆ T =⇒ B ∈ T
(6) Let A ∈ L, X = {s | P≥sA ∈ T } and t = sup(X). Then:
(i) For all r ∈ Q[0, t) we have that P>rA ∈ T
(ii) For all r ∈ Q[0, t) we have that P≥rA ∈ T
(iii) If t ∈ Q[0, 1] then P≥tA ∈ T .
(iv) For any r ∈ Q[0, 1]:
t ≥ r ⇐⇒ P≥rA ∈ T
As the next step we have to show that Lindenbaum lemma holds for the logic
PPJ.
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Lemma 15 (Lindenbaum). Let CS be a constant specification. Every PPJCS-
consistent set can be extended to a maximal PPJCS-consistent set.
Proof. This lemma has been proved for the logic PJ in [15] and the proof for PPJ
is similar. However, it is worth highlighting that the proof of the Lindenbaum
lemma for the logics PJ and PPJ is much more complex than usual. The reason
is that the logics PJ and PPJ can have proofs of infinite depth because of the
rule (ST). We briefly explain the amendments that need to be done to the usual
proof for Lindenbaum lemma.
The typical construction of the maximal consistent set in Lindenbaum lemma
is as follows:
Let T be a PPJCS-consistent set. Let A0, A1, A2, . . . be an enumeration of
all formulas in L. We define a sequence of sets {Ti}i∈N such that:
(1) T0 := T
(2) for every i ≥ 0:
(a) if Ti∪{Ai} is PJCS-consistent, then we set Ti+1 := Ti∪{Ai}, otherwise




It is then straightforward to show that T is PPJCS-maximal and that every Ti
is PPJCS-consistent. However the consistency of every Ti does not imply the
consistency of T , since proofs in PJ and PPJ may have infinite depth. We
can tackle this problem by adding the formula ¬(B → P≥s− 1nC) to Ti+1 for
a suitable n, when Ai is of the form B → P≥sC and Ti ∪ {Ai} is not PJCS-
consistent. Lemma 13 guarantees the existence of such an n.
Now we define a canonical model for any maximal PPJCS-consistent set of for-
mulas.
Definition 16 (Canonical Model). Let CS be a constant specification. The





∣∣ w is a maximal PPJCS-consistent set of L-formulas}
• for every w ∈ U the probability space 〈W (w), H(w), µ(w)〉 is defined as
follows:








∣∣ x ∈ U,A ∈ x}. If M is clear from the context,
we may simply write (A) instead of (A)M .




= sups {P≥sA ∈ w}
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• for every w ∈W the basic CS-evaluation ∗w is defined as follows:
1. for all p ∈ Prop:
p∗w =
{
T if p ∈ w
F if ¬p ∈ w




∣∣ t : A ∈ w}
The following properties of the set (A)M are direct consequences of Lemma 14.
Lemma 17. Let M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 be the canonical model for some PPJCS
and let A,B ∈ L. Then the following hold:
(i) (¬A)M = U \ (A)M
(ii) (A)M ∩ (B)M = (A ∧B)M
(iii) (A)M ∪ (B)M = (A ∨B)M
Now we will prove that the canonical model for PPJCS is a PPJCS-model.
Lemma 18. Let CS be a constant specification. The canonical model for PPJCS
is a PPJCS-model.
Proof. Let M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 be the canonical model for PPJCS. In order for
M to be a PPJCS-model we have to prove the following:
U is a non-empty set:
There exists a PPJCS-maximal consistent set. Thus U 6= ∅.
For every w ∈ U the triple 〈W (w),H(w), µ(w)〉 is a probability space:
We have to prove the following:
(1) W (w) is a non-empty subset of U
It is obvious since W (w) = U and U 6= ∅.
(2) H(w) is an algebra over W (w)
It holds that:
(>)M = {x | x ∈ U,> ∈ x} = U = W (w) .
Thus W (w) ∈ H(w).
Let (A)M ∈ H(w) for some A ∈ L. It holds that:
(A)M = {x | x ∈ U,A ∈ x} ⊆ U = W (w) .
Thus H(w) ⊆ P(W (w)).
Let (A), (B) ∈ H(w) for some A,B ∈ L. By Lemma 17 we have that
W (w) \ (A) = U \ (A) = (¬A) ∈ H(w) and (A) ∪ (B) = (A ∨B) ∈ H(w).
So, according to Definition 2, H(w) is an algebra over W (w).
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(3) µ(w) is a function from H(w) to [0, 1]:
We have to prove the following:
(a) the domain of µ(w) is H(w) and the codomain of µ(w) is
[0, 1]:
Let (A) ∈ H(w). We have that P≥0A is an axiom of PPJ, thus
P≥0A ∈ w. Hence the set {s ∈ S | P≥sA ∈ w} is not empty which
means that it has a supremum. So µ(w)((A)) is defined. Thus the
domain of µ(w) is H(w).
Let (A) ∈ H(w). We have that µ(w)((A)) = sups{P≥sA ∈ w} ≥ 0.
In sups{P≥sA ∈ w} we have by definition that s ∈ Q[0, 1], i.e. s ≤ 1.




≤ 1. So the codomain of
µ(w) is [0, 1].
(b) for every V ∈ H(w), µ(w)(V ) is unique:
Let V ∈ H(w) and assume that V = (A) = (B) for some A,B ∈ L.








. Of course it suffices to
prove that:










(A) ⊆ (B) implies
(∀x ∈ U)
[










A /∈ x or B ∈ x
]
implies by L. 14(1)
(∀x ∈ U)
[
¬A ∈ x or B ∈ x
]
implies by L. 14(3)
(∀x ∈ U)
[





x is a maximal PPJCS-consistent set (3)
=⇒ A→ B ∈ x
]
Assume that 0 A→ B. By propositional reasoning we get 0 ¬(A→
B)→ ⊥, which implies that the set {¬(A→ B)} is PPJCS-consistent.
By Lemma 15 we have that there exists a maximal PPJCS-consistent
set T such that T ⊇ {¬(A → B)}. However by (3) we have that
A → B ∈ T which contradicts the fact that T is PPJCS-consistent.
Thus ` A→ B. As a consequence, by Lemma 9, we have that





Hence, since w is a maximal PPJCS-consistent set, we get the follow-
12
ing:
(∀s ∈ Q[0, 1])
[
P≥sA→ P≥sB ∈ w
]
implies by L. 14(5)
(∀s ∈ Q[0, 1])
[
P≥sA ∈ w =⇒ P≥sB ∈ w
]
implies
{s ∈ Q[0, 1] | P≥sA ∈ w} ⊆ {s ∈ Q[0, 1] | P≥sB ∈ w} implies
sup
s
{P≥sA ∈ w} ≤ sup
s









Hence (2) holds, which proves that µ(w)(V ) is unique.
(4) µ(w) is a finitely additive measure:
This case has been proved in [15] for the logic PJ. This proof also works
for PPJ.
For every w ∈W ∗w is a basic CS-evaluation:
This holds by the construction of the canonical model
The fact that the canonical model is measurable will be a corollary of the next
lemma.
Lemma 19. Let M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 be the canonical model for PPJCS. Then
we have





Proof. Let w ∈ U and let A ∈ L. We will prove the claim by induction on the
complexity of A. We distinguish the following cases:
1. A ≡ p ∈ Prop. It holds that:
[A]M,w = [p]M,w = {x ∈W (w) | M,x |= p} = {x ∈ U | p∗x = T}
= {x ∈ U | p ∈ x} = (p)M = (A)M .
2. A ≡ t : B. It holds that:
[A]M,w = [t : B]M,w = {x ∈W (w) | M,x |= t : B} = {x ∈ U | B ∈ t∗x}
= {x ∈ U | t : B ∈ x} = (t : B)M = (A)M .
3. A ≡ P≥sB. By i.h. we have that for all x ∈ U , [B]M,x = (B)M ∈ H(x).
Thus, we have:
[A]M,w = [P≥sB]M,w ={x ∈W (w) | M,x |= P≥sB}










={x ∈ U | sup
r
{P≥rB ∈ x} ≥ s}
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By Lemma 14(6)(iv) we get:
[A]M,w = {x ∈ U | P≥sB ∈ x} = (P≥sB)M = (A)M .
4. A ≡ B ∧ C. It holds that:
[A]M,w = [B ∧ C]M,w = [B]M,w ∩ [C]M,w
i.h.= (B)M,w ∩ (C)M,w
L. 17(ii)= (B ∧ C)M,w = (A)M .
5. A ≡ ¬B. It holds that:
[A]M,w = [¬B]M,w = W (w) \ [B]M,w
i.h.= U \ (B)M,w
L. 17(i)= (¬B)M,w = (A)M .
From Lemmata 18 and 19 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 20. Let CS be any constant specification. The canonical model for
PPJCS is a PPJCS,Meas-model.
Proof. LetM = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 be the canonical model for PPJCS and let A ∈ L.
By Lemma 18 we have that M is a PPJCS-model. We also have that for any
w ∈ U , by Lemma 19, [A]M,w = (A)M ∈ H(w). Thus, M ∈ PPJCS,Meas.
Making use of the properties of maximal consistent sets, we can now establish
the Truth Lemma.
Lemma 21 (Truth Lemma). Let CS be some constant specification and let
M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 be the canonical model for PPJCS. For every A ∈ L and
any w ∈ U we have:
A ∈ w ⇐⇒ M,w |= A.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the structure of A. Let us only show
the case for A = P≥sB. It holds:
M,w |= A ⇐⇒










≥ s D. 16⇐⇒
sup
r
{P≥rB ∈ w} ≥ s
L. 14(6)(iv)⇐⇒
P≥sB ∈ w ⇐⇒
A ∈ w
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Finally, we get the strong completeness theorem as usual.
Theorem 22 (Strong Completeness for PPJ). Let CS be a constant specifica-
tion, let T ⊆ L and let A ∈ L. Then we have:
T |= A =⇒ T ` A.
Proof. We prove the claim by contraposition. Assume that T 0 A. This means
that T 0 (¬A) → ⊥, By Theorem 10 we get T,¬A 0 ⊥, i.e. the set T ∪ {¬A}
is PPJCS-consistent. By Lemma 15 there exists a maximal PPJCS-consistent
set w, such that w ⊇ T ∪ {¬A}. Let M be the canonical model for PPJCS.
By Corollary 20 we have that M ∈ PPJCS,Meas. By Lemma 21 we have that
M,w |= T and M,w |= ¬A. Hence T 6|= A.
4 Decidability for PPJ
Assume that we want to test some A ∈ L for satisfiability. The test is divided
in two parts: first we test whether the “justification and classical constraints”
that appear in A are satisfiable and then we test whether the “probabilistic
constraints” that appear in A are satisfiable. Of course we have to make sure
that both kinds of constraints are satisfied in the same PPJCS,Meas-model. The
satisfiability testing for the “justification and classical constraints” will be done
using an adaptation of the satisfiability algorithm for the logic J ([16, 17, 26,
31]), whereas the satisfiability testing for the “probabilistic constraints” will
be done using similar ideas as the ones used for the satisfiability testing in
the logic PJ [13]. In order to formally present our satisfiability algorithm we
will first explain what is meant under “satisfiability testing for justification and
classical constraints”, then what is formally meant under “satisfiability testing
for probabilistic constraints” and finally how both kind of constraints can be
satisfied at the same model.
By testing satisfiability of “justification and classical constraints” that appear
in an L-formula we mean that we test whether a CS-evaluation satisfies an L-
formula. In order to formally define the sentence “a CS-evaluation satisfies an
L-formula” we have to extend the definition of a CS-evaluation.
Definition 23 (Extended Basic CS-Evaluation). Let CS be any constant spec-
ification. An extended basic CS-evaluation, is a function ∗ that maps atomic
propositions and L-formulas of the form P≥sA to truth values and maps justi-
fication terms to sets of L-formulas such that the conditions of Definition 1 are
satisfied. That is for p ∈ Prop, u, v ∈ Tm, c ∈ Con, A,B ∈ L and s ∈ Q[0, 1] we
have:
(1) (P≥sA)∗ ∈ {T,F}, p∗ ∈ {T,F} and u∗ ⊆ L ;
(2)
(
A→ B ∈ u∗ and A ∈ v∗
)
=⇒ B ∈ (u · v)∗ ;
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(3) u∗ ∪ v∗ ⊆ (u+ v)∗ ;
(4) if (c, A) ∈ CS then for all n ∈ N we have:
!n−1c : !n−2c : · · · :!c : c : A ∈ (!nc)∗ .
Satisfiability under an extended basic CS-evaluation can be defined in the fol-
lowing way:
Definition 24 (Satisfiability under an Extended Basic CS-evaluation). Let CS
be a constant specification and let ∗ be some extended basic CS-evaluation. We
define what it means for an L-formula to hold in ∗ as follows:
∗ |= p ⇐⇒ p∗ = T for p ∈ Prop ;
∗ |= P≥sB ⇐⇒
(
P≥sB
)∗ = T ;
∗ |= ¬B ⇐⇒ ∗ 6|= B ;
∗ |= B ∧ C ⇐⇒
(
∗ |= B and ∗ |= C
)
;
∗ |= t : B ⇐⇒ B ∈ t∗ .
When we say that some A ∈ L is CS-satisfiable, we mean that there exists an
extended basic CS-evaluation that satisfies A.
According to Definition 24 the satisfiability of an L formula under an extended
basic CS-evaluation is similar to the satisfiability of a justification logic formula
under a basic CS-evaluation [4]. Therefore, it makes sense to use an extension of
the usual decision procedure for the basic justification logic J to decide whether
an L-formula is CS-satisfiable.
Before presenting the decidability algorithm for the logic PPJ, we briefly recall
the decidability algorithm for the logic J. Let A be a formula of justification
logic and let CS be a constant specification. The key point in the satisfiability
algorithm for the logic J is to decide whether some t : B that appears in A
holds, i.e. whether t justifies B. In general, this problem is undecidable since a
given term may justify infinitely many formulas.
This problem can be solved by restricting the constant specification to be
schematic. If we use schematic variables for formulas, then we can represent
a schematic constant specification in a finite way, which also makes the number
of (schematic) formulas that are justified by a term finite. The decision algo-
rithm for the logic J also requires finding all formulas that are instances of two
formula schemes, i.e. unifying two formula schemes. This question is naturally
answered by finding the most general unifier of the two schemes.
Lemma 25. Let CS be a decidable and almost schematic constant specification.
For any formula A ∈ L, it is decidable whether A is CS-satisfiable.
Proof. As mentioned earlier we can test whether an L-formula is CS-satisfiable
by extending the decidability algorithm for justification logic J. Most of the
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algorithm can be easily adapted to our probabilistic setting. The only part of
the algorithm that needs major adaptations is the representation of schematic
formulas and therefore the unification algorithm.
In the setting of PPJ we need three kinds of schematic variables: for terms,
formulas and rational numbers. Because of the side conditions that come with
the axioms (L1) and (Add2) our schematic formulas should be paired with sys-
tems of linear inequalities. For example, the scheme (L1) should be represented
by the schematic formula P≤rA → P<sA (with the schematic variables r, s,
and A) together with the inequality r < s, whereas a scheme that is obtained





P≤r2A2 ∧ P<s2B2 → P<r2+s2(A2 ∨B2)
)
together with the inequalities{
r1 < s1, r2 + s2 ≤ 1
}
.
We should not forget that the rational variables belong to Q[0, 1]. So we have
to add constraints like 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Hence in addition to constructing a substitution, the unification algorithm also
has to take care of the linear constraints. For instance, in order to unify the
schemes P≥rA and P≥sB the algorithm has to unify A and B, and to equate
r and s, i.e. it adds r = s to the linear system. In the end, the constructed
substitution only is a most general unifier if the linear system is satisfiable.
This implies decidability of the PPJCS,Meas-satisfiability problem since it is well
known that satisfiability testing for systems of linear equations is decidable (see
e.g. [24]).
Another complication are constraints of the form
l = min(1, r + s) (4)
that originate from the scheme (Add1). Obviously, Eq. (4) is not linear. How-
ever, for a linear system C, we find that
C ∪ {l = min(1, r + s)}
has a solution if and only if
C ∪ {l = r + s, r + s ≤ 1} or C ∪ {l = 1, r + s > 1}
has a solution. Thus we can reduce solving a system involving Eq. (4) to solving
several linear systems.
Lemma 25 is enough for testing whether “justification and classical constraints”
can be satisfied. Now we proceed with definitions and lemmata that are needed
for testing the satisfiability of “probabilistic constraints”.
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Definition 26 (Subformulas and Atoms). The set of subformulas, subf(·), of
an L-formula is recursively defined by:
subf(p) := {p} for p ∈ Prop ;
subf(P≥sA) := {P≥sA} ∪ subf(A) ;
subf(¬A) := {¬A} ∪ subf(A) ;
subf(A ∧B) := {A ∧B} ∪ subf(A) ∪ subf(B) ;
subf(t : A) := {t : A} ∪ subf(A) .
Assume that subf(A) = {A1, . . . , Ak} for some A ∈ L. A formula of the form
±A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±Ak ,
where ±Ai is either Ai or ¬Ai, will be called an atom of A. The set atoms(A)
contains all atoms of A.
Let C ∈ atoms(A) for some A. Then B ∈ C means that B is a subformula of A
that appears in C (either negated or not).
Lemma 27. Let M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 ∈ PPJCS,Meas and let A ∈ L. Further, let
B ∈ subf(A), let C ∈ atoms(A) and let w ∈ U . Assume that M,w |= C. Then
we have:
M,w |= B ⇐⇒ B ∈ C.
Proof. We prove the two directions of the lemma separately:
⇐=: From B ∈ C and M,w |= C we immediately get M,w |= B.
=⇒: Since B is a subformula of A, we have either B ∈ C or ¬B ∈ C. If ¬B ∈ C,
then we would have M,w |= ¬B, i.e. M,w 6|= B, which contradicts the fact that
M,w |= B. Thus, we conclude B ∈ C.
The next lemma is the key for proving decidability of PPJCS. It completes
the algorithm that we described from the beginning of the section by formally
explaining how “justification and classical constraints” and “probabilistic con-
straints” can be satisfied in the same model. As it will be clear from the proof
the formulas of the set Y should all hold in worlds of some model. Hence, since
the set Y is finite Lemma 28 expresses a small model property. The x′ijs in the
Lemma should be understood as probabilities that are assigned to each of the
worlds that satisfy a member of Y .
Lemma 28. Let CS be a constant specification and let A be an L-formula. A
is PPJCS,Meas-satisfiable if and only if there exists a non-empty set
Y = {B1 , . . . , Bn} ⊆ atoms(A)
such that all of the following conditions hold:
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1. for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, A ∈ Bi.
2. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists an extended basic CS-evaluation that
satisfies Bi.
3. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are some xij with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, that satisfy the












for every ¬P≥sC ∈ Bi,
∑
{j|C∈Bj}
xij < s .
Proof. Let CS be a constant specification and let A ∈ L. We prove the two
directions of the lemma separately:
=⇒: LetM = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 ∈ PPJCS,Meas. Assume that A is satisfiable in some
world of M .
Let ≈ denote a binary relation over U such that for all w, x ∈ U we have:




M,w |= B ⇔M,x |= B
]
.
It is easy to see that ≈ is an equivalence relation. Let K1, . . . ,Kn be the
equivalence classes of ≈ over U . For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we choose some
wi ∈ Ki. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} some subformulas of A hold in the world
wi and some do not. So, without loss of generality, we assume that for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists a Bi ∈ atoms(A) such that M,wi |= Bi. For i 6= j
we have Bi 6= Bj since wi and wj belong to different equivalence classes. Let
Y = {B1, . . . , Bn}. Since A holds in some wi, Y is non-empty. It remains to
show that the conditions in the statement of the lemma hold:
1. Let w ∈ U be such that M,w |= A. The world w belongs to some equiva-
lence class of ≈ that is represented by wi. ThusM,wi |= A. By Lemma 27
we find A ∈ Bi, i.e. condition 1 holds.
2. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It holds that M,wi |= Bi. We define the extended
basic CS-evaluation ∗i as follows (the fact that ∗i is an extended basic
CS-evaluation immediately follows from the fact that ∗wi is a basic CS-
evaluation):
• for every p ∈ Prop:
p∗i = p∗wi ;
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• for every P≥sB ∈ L:
(P≥sB)∗i =
{
T , if M,wi |= P≥sB
F , if M,wi 6|= P≥sB ;
• for every t ∈ Tm :
t∗i = t∗wi .
The following statement can be shown by straightforward induction on
the complexity of the formula.(
∀B ∈ subf(Bi)
)
[M,wi |= B ⇐⇒ ∗i |= B] (5)
Since, Bi ∈ subf(Bi) and M,wi |= Bi, by statement 5 we get ∗i |= Bi.
And of course this holds for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, condition 2 holds.
3. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We set
yij = µ(wi)(Kj ∩W (wi)), for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n . (6)
We are going to do some calculations to show that these values yij satisfy
the linear system in condition 3.


















And since µ(wi) is a finitely additive measure over W (wi) we get:∑
1≤j≤n
yij = 1 . (7)
By Eq. (6) we also have:





Let P≥sC ∈ Bi. Since M,wi |= Bi it also holds that M,wi |= P≥sC, i.e.
µ(wi)([C]M,wi) ≥ s . (9)
20





= [C]M,wi . (10)
Let w ∈ [C]M,wi . We have w ∈ W (wi) and M,w |= C. w must belong
to some Kj . We also have that M,wj |= C and M,wj |= Bj , which by
Lemma 27 implies C ∈ Bj . Thus, we proved that there exists some j such












Kj ∩ W (wi)
)
. So, there exists
some j, such that C ∈ Bj and w ∈ Kj ∩W (wi). It holds that M,wj |= Bj
and since w ∈ Kj we have that M,w |= Bj which implies that M,w |= C.
So, since w ∈W (wi), we have that w ∈ [C]M,wi .
Therefore Eq. (10) holds.








Since the Kj ’s are mutually disjoint and µ(wi) is a finitely additive mea-







and by Eq. (6): ∑
{j|C∈Bj}
yij ≥ s .
So we proved that
for every P≥sC ∈ Bi,
∑
{j|C∈Bj}
yij ≥ s . (11)
By a similar reasoning we can prove that
for every ¬P≥sC ∈ Bi,
∑
{j|C∈Bj}
yij < s . (12)
By Eqs. (7), (8), (11) and (12) we have that the yij ’s satisfy the linear
system in condition 3.
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⇐=: Assume that there exists some Y = {B1, . . . , Bn} ⊆ atoms(A) such that
conditions 1–3 in the lemma’s statement hold. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let ∗i be an
extended basic CS-evaluation such that ∗i |= Bi (by condition 2 we know that
such an extended basic CS-evaluation exists). Let xij , for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, be
numbers that satisfy the linear system in condition 3.
We define the quintuple M = 〈U,W,H, µ, ∗〉 as follows:
• U = {w1, . . . , wn} for some w1, . . . , wn.
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we set:
1. W (wi) = U ;
2. H(wi) = P(W (wi));













First we show that M ∈ PPJCS,Meas. Since Y is non-empty, n is positive thus U
is non-empty too. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It holds that:
(i) H(wi) is an algebra over W (wi), since H(wi) is the powerset of W (wi).
(ii) For every A ∈ L we have that [A]M,wi ∈ P(W (wi)), i.e. [A]M,wi ∈ H(wi).
(iii) µ(wi) is defined for all V ∈ H(wi) and by the first two lines of the linear
system in condition 3 it holds that the codomain of µ(wi) is [0, 1].
We also have that:






xij = 1 .
Let U, V ∈ H(wi) such that U ∩ V = ∅. It holds











= µ(wi)(U) + µ(wi)(V ) .
Thus, µ(wi) is a finitely additive measure over H(wi).
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(iv) The fact that ∗i is an extended basic CS-evaluation immediately implies
that ∗wi is a basic CS-evaluation.
From (i) - (iv) we conclude thatM ∈ PPJCS,Meas. It remains to showM,wi |= A
for some i.
First we have to show the following statement:
(∀D ∈ subf(A))(∀1 ≤ i ≤ n)
[
D ∈ Bi ⇐⇒M,wi |= D
]
. (13)
Let D ∈ Bi. We will prove statement (13) by induction on the structure of D.
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We distinguish the following cases:
D ≡ p ∈ Prop: It holds:
D ∈ Bi ⇐⇒
p ∈ Bi ⇐⇒
∗i |= p ⇐⇒
p∗i = T ⇐⇒
p∗wi = T ⇐⇒
M,wi |= p ⇐⇒
M,wi |= D .
D ≡ t : C: We have:
D ∈ Bi ⇐⇒
t : C ∈ Bi ⇐⇒
∗i |= t : C ⇐⇒
C ∈ t∗i ⇐⇒
C ∈ t∗wi ⇐⇒
M,wi |= t : C ⇐⇒
M,wi |= D .
D ≡ P≥sC . We prove the two directions of the claim separately.
=⇒: Assume that D ∈ Bi, i.e. P≥sC ∈ Bi. By the third line of the linear
system in condition 3 we have:∑
{j|C∈Bj}
xij ≥ s .
By the inductive hypothesis we have:∑
{j|M,wj |=C}
xij ≥ s . (14)
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It holds that
[C]M,wi = {wj ∈W (wi) | M,wj |= C} = {wj | M,wj |= C} . (15)














M,wi |= D .
⇐=: Let M,wi |= D. Assume that D /∈ Bi, i.e. ¬D ∈ Bi, that is:
¬P≥sC ∈ Bi .
By the last line of the linear system in condition 3 we have that∑
j:C∈Bj
xij < s .




which is absurd. Therefore D ∈ Bi.
D ≡ D1 ∧D2: Here D ∈ Bi means
D1 ∧D2 ∈ Bi . (16)
We know that ∗i |= Bi. Assume that D1 /∈ Bi or D2 /∈ Bi. Then it should
be ¬D1 ∈ Bi or ¬D2 ∈ Bi, i.e. ∗i 1 D1 or ∗i 1 D2. But this is absurd
since we have that ∗i |= D1 ∧ D2. So, both D1 and D2 belong to Bi.
Hence (16) is equivalent to the following statements.
D1 ∈ Bi and D2 ∈ Bi
i.h.⇐⇒
M,wi |= D1 and M,wi |= D2 ⇐⇒
M,wi |= D1 ∧D2 ⇐⇒
M,wi |= D .
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D ≡ ¬D′: We have:
D ∈ Bi ⇐⇒
¬D′ ∈ Bi ⇐⇒
D′ /∈ Bi
i.h.⇐⇒
M,wi 6|= D′ ⇐⇒
M,wi |= ¬D′ ⇐⇒
M,wi |= D .
We conclude that statement (13) holds.
We have A ∈ subf(A). Thus, by statement (13) we find:
(∀1 ≤ i ≤ n)
[
A ∈ Bi ⇐⇒M,wi |= A
]
.
By condition 1, there exists an i such that A ∈ Bi. Thus, there exists an i such
that M,wi |= A. Hence, A is PPJCS,Meas-satisfiable.
In the proof of Lemma 28 we construct a model with at most 2|subf(A)| worlds
that satisfies A. Hence a corollary of Lemma 28 is that any A ∈ L is PPJCS,Meas-
satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable in a PPJCS,Meas-model with at most
2|subf(A)| worlds. In other words, as we already mentioned, Lemma 28 implies a
small model property for PPJCS. Moreover, Lemma 28 dictates a procedure to
decide the satisfiability problem for PPJCS.
Theorem 29. Let CS be a decidable and schematic constant specification. The
PPJCS,Meas-satisfiability problem is decidable.
Proof. Let CS be a decidable almost schematic constant specification and let
A ∈ L. The formula A is satisfiable if and only if for some Y ⊆ atoms(A)
all conditions in the statement of Lemma 28 hold. Since atoms(A) is finite, it
suffices to show that for every Y ⊆ atoms(A) the conditions 1–3 in the statement
of Lemma 28 can be effectively checked:
• Decidability of condition 1 is trivial.
• Decidability of condition 2 follows from Lemma 25.
• In condition 3 we have to check for the satisfiability of a set of linear in-
equalities. There are several decision procedures available for this problem
(see, for example, [24]).
We conclude that the PPJCS,Meas-satisfiability problem is decidable.
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5 Application to the Lottery Paradox
Kyburg’s famous lottery paradox [22] goes as follows. Consider a fair lottery
with 1000 tickets that has exactly one winning ticket. Now assume a proposition
is believed if and only if its degree of belief is greater than 0.99. In this setting
it is rational to believe that ticket 1 does not win, it is rational to believe that
ticket 2 does not win, and so on. However, this entails that it is rational to
believe that no ticket wins because rational belief is closed under conjunction.
Hence it is rational to believe that no ticket wins and that one ticket wins.
PPJCS makes the following analysis of the lottery paradox possible. First we
need a principle to move from degrees of belief to rational belief (this formalizes
what Foley [10] calls the Lockean thesis): we suppose that for each term t, there
exists a term pb(t) such that
t : (P>0.99A) → pb(t) : A (17)
(where pb stands for probabilistic belief). Let wi be the proposition ticket i
wins. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 1000, there is a term ti such that ti : (P= 9991000¬wi) holds.
Hence by (17) we get
pb(ti) : ¬wi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 1000. (18)
Now if CS is axiomatically appropriate, then
s1 : A ∧ s2 : B → con(s1, s2) : (A ∧B) (19)
is a valid principle (for a suitable term con(s1, s2)). Hence by (18) we conclude
that
there exists a term t with t : (¬w1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬w1000), (20)
which leads to a paradoxical situation since it is also believed that one of the
tickets wins.
In PPJCS we can resolve this problem by restricting the constant specification
such that (19) is valid only if con(s1, s2) does not contain two different subterms
of the form pb(t). Then the step from (18) to (20) is no longer possible and we
can avoid the paradoxical belief.
This analysis is inspired by Leitgeb’s [23] solution to the lottery paradox and his
Stability Theory of Belief according to which it is not permissible to apply the
conjunction rule for beliefs across different contexts. Our proposed restriction
of (19) is one way to achieve this in a formal system. A related and very
interesting question is whether one can interpret the above justifications ti as
stable sets in Leitgeb’s sense. Of course, our discussion of the lottery paradox
is very sketchy but we think that probabilistic justification logic provides a
promising approach to it that is worth further investigations.
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6 Conclusion
Extending the work of [15] we defined a probabilistic justification logic, PPJ, to
study rational belief, degrees of belief and justifications. The logic PPJ is an
extension of the probabilistic justification logic from [15] in the sense that PPJ
allows iterations of the probability operators and justification operators over
probability operators. In the framework of PPJ it is also possible to analyze a
famous paradox from epistemology, i.e. the lottery paradox [22].
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that heuristics have been applied for at-
tacking the satisfiability problem for probabilistic logics with classical base [28].
It could be of practical interest to apply these heuristics to the satisfiability
problem of probabilistic justification logic, too.
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